Peleg (1986) and Tadenuma (1992) provide two well-known axiomatic characterizations of the core on the domain of balanced TU games. Peleg's characterization says that the core is the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and a reduced game property introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965) . Tadenuma's characterization says that the core is the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality and a reduced game property introduced by Moulin (1985) . In this note, we investigate what happens when the domain is restricted to the class of convex TU games. In particular, we show that (i) the core is not the only solution that satisfies Peleg's four axioms and anonymity; (ii) the core is the only solution that satisfies Peleg's four axioms, anonymity, and additional three axioms; and (iii) the core is not the only solution that satisfies Tadenuma's three axioms and anonymity.
Introduction
The core (Gillies, 1959 ) is one of the most important solutions for cooperative games. It is important mainly because it satisfies many desirable properties. In particular, it satisfies two kinds of reduced game properties, namely, "max consistency" (Davis and Maschler, 1965) and "complement consistency" (Moulin, 1985) .
1 There are two well-known axiomatic characterizations of the core on the domain of balanced TU games based on each of these two axioms: (i) the core is the only solution that satisfies nonemptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency (Peleg, 1986); (ii) it is the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality and complement consistency (Tadenuma, 1992 ).
2
In this note, we investigate what happens when the domain is restricted to the class of convex TU games. Although the core satisfies Peleg's four axioms on this domain, it is not the only one. 3 It so happens that except for the core itself, all existing examples of such solutions violate anonymity. So, one may conjecture that an axiomatic characterization of the core might be obtained by adding anonymity to Peleg's three axioms. In this note, we disprove this conjecture. We also consider a similar problem for complement consistency. In particular, we show that the core is not the only solution on the domain of convex games that satisfies Tadenuma's three axioms and anonymity.
Definitions and questions
Let N denote the class of non-empty and finite subsets of the set N of natural numbers. We use ⊂ for strict set inclusion, and ⊆ for weak set inclusion. There is an infinite set of "potential" players indexed by the members of N. Given N ∈ N , a transferable utility (TU) game for N is a function v : 2 N → R with v(∅) = 0. A game v for N is convex (Shapley, 1971) 
if for all i ∈ N and all S, T ∈ 2 N with i ∈ S ⊂ T , we have v(S) − v(S \ {i}) ≤ v(T ) − v(T \ {i}). Let

(S)v(S).
1 These two axioms are usually called "DM-consistency" and "M-consistency", respectively. We use the terminology introduced by Thomson (1996) and call them max consistency and complement consistency because each name suggests how the underlying "reduced games" are defined in each case.
2 Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1998) provide an axiomatization of the core which is closely related to Tadenuma's result.
3 Although this fact is widely known, we don't know any published or unpublished paper that mentions it.
Given a game v for N , the core of v, denoted C(v), is the set of vectors
It is well-known that a game is balanced if and only if its core is non-empty (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) . It is also well-known that every convex game is balanced (Shapley, 1971) .
Suppose that for all N ∈ N , a class V N of games for N is specified, and
The core, as a mapping, is a solution on the class of balanced games. We use ϕ as a generic notation for solutions.
Next, we define max consistency (Davis and Maschler, 1965) and complement consistency (Moulin, 1985) . Each of these axioms says that the original choice should be "confirmed" in associated "reduced games," obtained by imagining a subset of players leaving with their payoffs and reevaluating the situation from the viewpoint of the remaining players. The different definitions come from the various ways of performing this reassessment.
Given N ∈ N , a game v for N , x ∈ R N , and N ′ ⊂ N , the max reduced game of v relative to x and N ′ , denotedr
Max consistency: A solution ϕ satisfies max consistency if and only if for all N ∈ N , all v ∈ V N , all x ∈ ϕ(v), and all N ′ ⊂ N , we haver
N , and N ′ ⊂ N , the complement reduced game of v relative to x and N ′ , denoted r
Complement consistency: A solution ϕ satisfies complement consistency if and only if for all
). The following axioms apply to games with a fixed set of players.
Non-emptiness:
Individual rationality: For all v ∈ V N , all x ∈ ϕ(v), and all i ∈ N , we have x i ≥ v({i}).
Super-additivity:
As mentioned above, on the domain of balanced games, (i) the core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality, superadditivity, and max consistency (Peleg, 1986) ; and (ii) the core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality and complement consistency (Tadenuma, 1992) . On the domain of convex games, the core satisfies max consistency (Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley, 1972) , as well as nonemptiness, individual rationality, and super-additivity. Given a strict ordering ≺ on N, consider the following solution ϕ ≺ , which picks for each convex game the "marginal contribution vector" with respect to ≺:
On the domain of convex games, this solution satisfies max consistency (Orshan, 1994; Núñez and Rafels, 1998; Hokari, 2005) . Moreover, it satisfies non-emptiness, super-additivity, and individual rationality. This means that on the domain of convex games, the core is not the only solution that satisfies Peleg's four axioms. Clearly, the above solution violates the following axiom:
As far as we know, other than the core itself, no anonymous solution on the domain of convex games that satisfies Peleg's three axioms can been found in the literature. So, the first question we would like to ask is the following: Question 1. On the domain of convex games, is the core the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, max consistency, and anonymity?
Now, let us consider complement consistency. It is trivial to show that the core satisfies this axiom on the domain of convex games. Given that the core satisfies this property on the domain of balanced games, the only thing we have to check is whether the class of convex games is closed under the reduction operation underlying complement consistency.
Lemma 1.
On the domain of convex games, the core satisfies complement consistency.
Since the core satisfies complement consistency on the domain of balanced games (Tadenuma, 1992) , it is enough to show that r
where the last inequality follows from the convexity of v.
where the last two inequalities follow from x ∈ C(v) and the convexity of v, respectively.
So, the next question is:
Question 2. On the domain of convex games, is the core the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality, and complement consistency? If it is not, what if anonymity is added to this list of axioms?
Results
Consider the following solution ϕ * on the domain of convex games: for all
Non-emptiness of ϕ * (v) can be checked as follows:
is a convex set, one can obtain an element of ϕ * (v) by taking a strict convex combination of these y S 's. Essentially, ϕ * is the relative interior of the core. Note that ϕ * trivially satisfies individual rationality and anonymity. On the domain of balanced games, ϕ * satisfies max consistency (Yanovskaya, 1999) . Together with the fact that the core satisfies the property on the domain of convex games, the max consistency of ϕ * on the domain of balanced games implies the max consistency of ϕ * on the domain of convex games. We show that it also satisfies super-additivity.
Lemma 2. On the domain of convex games, ϕ
* satisfies super-additivity.
, and y ∈ ϕ * (w). Since the core is super-additive and ϕ * is a subsolution of the core, we have
Note that on the domain of convex games, the core is additive (Dragan, Potters, and Tijs, 1989). 4 Thus, there exist
Together with x ∈ C(v) and y ∈ C(w), this implies
We have the following result: Proposition 1. On the domain of convex games, the core is not the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, max consistency, and anonymity.
Next, let us consider Question 2. Our starting point is the solution ϕ ≺ , defined in Section 2, that picks for each game the marginal contribution vector with respect to a given ordering ≺ of players. Although ϕ ≺ itself does not satisfy complement consistency, we can enlarge it so that the resulting 
solution satisfies the axiom. Then we endogenize the strict ordering ≺ to make the resulting solution anonymous.
Consider the following solution ϕ * * on the domain of convex games: for all N ∈ N , all v ∈ V N vex , and all x ∈ C(v), x ∈ ϕ * * (v) if and only if there exists a strict ordering ≺ on N such that
Again, since the marginal contribution vectors are in the core on this domain, ϕ * * satisfies non-emptiness. Note that it coincides with the core when |N | ≤ 2. Figure 1 illustrates a case in which ϕ * * (v) does not coincides with the core, and there are two strict orderings that satisfy condition (i) above. This solution trivially satisfies anonymity and individual rationality. We show that it also satisfies complement consistency.
Lemma 3.
On the domain of convex games, ϕ * * satisfies complement consistency.
, and x ∈ ϕ * * (v). By the definition of ϕ * * (v), there exists a strict ordering ≺ on N such that
Since x ∈ C(v) and the core is complement consistent, we have r
, and we are done.
). So, we have the following answer to Question 2: Proposition 2. On the domain of convex games, the core is not the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality, complement consistency, and anonymity.
Given Propositions 1 and 2, one may wonder what axioms could be added to either of these lists to obtain the core as the unique solution. 5 Here we provide a partial answer: by adding the following three axioms to the list of axioms that appear in Proposition 1, we can single out the core.
Homogeneity: For all v, w ∈ V N , all a ∈ R ++ , and all x ∈ ϕ(v), if w = αv, then αx ∈ ϕ(w).
Converse max consistency (Peleg, 1986) :
Proposition 3.
On the domain of convex games, the core is the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, anonymity, homogeneity, closedness, max consistency, and converse max consistency.
We don't know whether homogeneity is independent from others. In this sense, this axiomatization is not complete. However, since homogeneity itself is a desirable and innocuous property, one can properly say that Proposition 3 essentially describes the implications of all other axioms.
Finally, although we have shown that two well-known axiomatizations break down if the domain is restricted to the class of convex games, we should mention that there is another axiomatization of the core on the domain of all TU games provided by Peleg (1986) , which remains valid even on the domain of convex games. 6 It says that on this domain, the core is the only solution that satisfies max consistency, converse max consistency, and the additional axiom of "unanimity", which says that the solution should coincide with the core in the two-person case.
[14] Tadenuma K (1992) Reduced games, consistency, and the core. 
Appendix
In this appendix, first, we prove Proposition 3, and then prove the claim that ϕ * satisfies converse max consistency. Consider the following axioms: 
Lemma 5. On the domain of convex games, if a solution satisfies homogeneity and super-additivity, then it is convex-valued.
Proof. Let ϕ be a solution on V vex that satisfies homogeneity and superadditivity.
, and λ ∈ (0, 1). We want to show that λx
The following lemma is due to Peleg (1986).
Lemma 6. On the domain of balanced games, if a solution satisfies individual rationality and max consistency, then it satisfies efficiency.
A similar claim for convex games can be proved in exactly the same way as Peleg's proof of Lemma 6. So, its proof is omitted.
Lemma 7.
On the domain of convex games, if a solution satisfies individual rationality and max consistency, then it satisfies efficiency.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The core satisfies the seven axioms. Let ϕ be a solution on V vex that satisfies the seven axioms. We show that ϕ coincides with the core. Since both the core and ϕ satisfy converse max consistency, it is enough to show that ϕ coincides with the core in the two-person case.
By 
First, suppose that α = 
On the domain of convex games, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969 ) is the only solution that coincides with the standard solution in the two-person case and satisfies max consistency. 7 Thus, ϕ coincides with the nucleolus. However, the nucleolus violates super-additivity. Thus, α cannot be 1 2 . Next, suppose that and v(N ) = 3 . We show that if
First, we show that (x
Thus,
We show that if So, we conclude that ϕ coincides with the core on the whole domain. 
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) = x(S) + x(T ) = x(S ∪ T ) + x(S ∩ T ). Since x ∈ C(v), we have x(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) and x(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S ∩ T ). Thus, x(S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ T ) and x(S ∩ T ) = v(S ∩ T ).
Proof
